Cuba's Real Power: Beyond Díaz-Canel, Washington Sees Castro's...

What Happened

US officials interpret Cuba's power structure as extending beyond President Miguel Díaz-Canel. They believe significant influence remains with the Castro family, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the Communist Party bureaucracy. This understanding is shaping the US strategy of increasing economic pressure on these elite-linked structures.

This approach aims to foster internal divisions and encourage a political transformation within Cuba.

Where and When

This analysis of Cuba's power dynamics is reportedly held by US officials and was cited by Bloomberg. The context is the current administration's policy towards Cuba, as of August 2026, under President Donald J. Trump. The strategy involves applying economic pressure on key Cuban economic entities.

The timeframe for desired change is before January 2029, though US officials acknowledge this is a long-term process.

Why It Matters

Washington's perception is that Díaz-Canel, while the official head of state, operates with limited autonomy. His maneuverability is reportedly constrained by established power centers that have historically controlled Cuba's political and economic landscape.

Understanding this complex web of influence is crucial for predicting the effectiveness of US sanctions and for contemplating Cuba's future political trajectory. It suggests that targeting the visible leader alone may not be sufficient for significant change.

What the Parties Say

According to Bloomberg's reporting, US officials believe that figures like Díaz-Canel are figureheads. They see the Communist Party maintaining political control, while the military, through conglomerates like GAESA, retains substantial economic power in strategic sectors like tourism and foreign exchange. Raúl Castro's influence, though not in direct leadership, is also considered significant through his close associates holding key positions.

The US strategy, therefore, focuses on economic sanctions against entities like GAESA, aiming to cut off resources and create internal pressure within the ruling elite.

What Comes Next

The US administration hopes these pressures will lead to negotiations or shifts in the elite's position. However, they acknowledge that economic crisis does not automatically guarantee democratic transition and could instead lead to increased resistance or internal power realignments.

A significant challenge for the US is the lack of a unified, broadly accepted opposition leadership in Cuba capable of stepping in during a crisis. Thus, even a departure of Díaz-Canel might not lead to regime change without addressing the deeper power structures.